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‘Playing Cold War politics’: The Cold War in Anglo-Kenyan Relations in the 1960s 
 
‘It will be a difficult task keeping Africa clear of ideologies. There will be the Cold War 
growling its thunder around us’.1 So wrote leading Kenyan politician Tom Mboya in 1963, the 
year of Kenyan independence from the British Empire. The Cold War certainly had a striking 
influence on the African continent as countries gained independence from European colonialism 
and sought to carve out independent foreign policies. In Kenya, the influence of the Cold War 
has most often been explored in the realm of domestic politics and the factional disputes of the 
early 1960s between the American-backed Mboya, Minister for Economic Planning and 
Development, and Vice President Oginga Odinga, who fostered relations with communist 
countries. This article will focus on the 1960s, when Kenya publicly committed to the common 
African tropes of non-alignment and African Socialism, but, despite this, under the leadership of 
President Jomo Kenyatta favoured the West, and had especially close links to Britain.   
Recent scholarship has stressed the importance of the Cold War in contexts beyond the 
superpowers or their most obvious allies.2 Following Westad, historians’ attention has turned to 
the global nature of the Cold War.3 For African countries, the Cold War could be beneficial in 
giving the continent a significance for the international community that it might otherwise have 
lacked. In his study of Africa during the Cold War period, Reynolds has argued that Cold War 
competition ‘offered African leaders and activists opportunities and options that simply had not 
existed a decade or two before’.4 On this reading, this was in fact an advantageous time for 
decolonization to occur, as it gave increased opportunities to negotiate relationships. McKay, 
writing in 1966, even went so far as to suggest that ‘although Africans often tell the West to 
“keep the Cold War out of Africa”, some of them regard it as a blessing in disguise’.5 The 
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continent would otherwise likely have attracted much less attention beyond the former colonial 
powers, as well as less aid and development assistance, much of which was tied, implicitly or 
explicitly, to supporting a partner within the Cold War. This situation was revealed when the 
Cold War ended, leaving African states with few other options but to accept the ties which now 
came with financial assistance, including a greater push towards democratisation.6   
The question which arises from this, and which this article addresses, is how much 
agency Africans had to shape and direct these relationships. In 1971, Mayall argued that 
Africans’ bargaining power was highly limited.7 Two decades later, Okoth argued that extensive 
American influence in post-colonial Kenya ‘left Kenya with virtually no right to determine its 
own form of government and economy’.8 These views give too much control to outside forces to 
shape Kenyan policies, leaving Kenyans virtually without agency. Scholars have been gradually 
revealing the agency of smaller powers within the global Cold War. Westad, for example, 
highlighted ‘the key role local elites played in abetting and facilitating these superpower 
interventions’.9 Clapham has also argued of the superpowers that ‘their activities in the continent 
were in practice fuelled by the agendas of African actors, every bit as much as by their own’.10 
Most recently, DeRoche has demonstrated Zambian President Kenneth Kaunda’s ability to assert 
agency in his relationship with the United States.11  
Nonetheless, the extent of the agency granted to Africans has often been fairly limited. 
Gerits has recently called for ‘reconsidering the agency of African leaders in international affairs. 
While global Cold War historians emphasise that post-colonial diplomats were not mere pawns 
of the superpowers, the manoeuvring room granted to these actors is limited’.12 This article 
argues that Kenyatta’s room for manoeuvre was often substantially greater than has been 
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previously suggested. Kenyatta and other leading Kenyans used Cold War rhetoric and rivalries 
to their advantage to exert significant influence over British choices and courses of action. This 
article shows that this could be a successful strategy even though Kenya was not looking to 
either of the superpowers but to Britain, at a time when Britain was largely recognised as 
Kenyatta’s primary international partner. Using the Cold War as a negotiating tactic was thus not 
exclusively concerned with the competition between the superpowers, or between China and the 
Soviet Union.  
The article begins by exploring the ways in which Kenyan politicians used the Cold War 
to position themselves in domestic politics. It then shows that the Cold War also affected Kenyan 
decisions about foreign policy, including non-alignment and African Socialism. The article goes 
on to discuss arms negotiations. These reveal how leading Kenyans consciously exploited their 
Cold War alignment in order to get better deals from the British – and British officials 
responded. Britain was often the beneficiary of Kenya’s Cold War policies, as a major supplier 
of arms and treated favourably by Kenyatta. Yet, in all of these areas, Kenyan agency was clear, 
and other countries, including Britain, were in no position to dictate but had to respond to 
Kenyan actions. The article is largely based on British government sources, meaning that its 
analysis is not wholly indicative of internal Kenyan discussions and calculations. Nonetheless, 
these sources do give a sense of important trends, and allow for an appreciation of the ways in 
which British policy-makers interpreted Kenyan politics. These also reveal the significant 
amount of agency that British officials believed the Kenyans had in this relationship. 
 
Domestic power struggles 
Before independence, British officials had been concerned by the activities and views of 
leading nationalist Kenyatta. Kenyatta was imprisoned as leader of Mau Mau in 1952, before 
being finally released in 1961, becoming Kenya’s first independent prime minister and later 
president. Prior to his detention, he had spent substantial time in Britain and married an English 
woman. He had also visited the Soviet Union, and was monitored by the British intelligence 
service MI5 from the early 1930s. According to Walton, his phone calls and mail were 
intercepted, and MI5 ‘compiled a “large file” on him’, but ‘he left the Soviet Union unconvinced, 
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unconverted and distinctly un-communist’.13 Kenyatta did not have strong communist contacts 
or inclinations. Nonetheless, as the supposed leader of Mau Mau, he was sometimes ascribed 
such sympathies: former British Colonial Secretary Oliver Lyttelton described Kenyatta in his 
1962 memoirs as ‘a daemonic figure with extreme left-wing views’.14 When he was released 
from detention, Kenyatta was not anticipated by most British observers to be pro-British or pro-
Western, and colonial officials were concerned about Kenya turning away from the West:  
Nor is it likely that we shall see in Kenya a Government which is actively pro-Western in 
its foreign policy. The most we can expect is one which is not committed to either side in 
the East/West struggle and one which, because it is reasonably stable, does not offer too 
many opportunities for exploitation and penetration by the Communist powers.15  
Kenyatta was personally so significant because Kenyan foreign policy was largely made by him 
and a very narrow elite around him, rather than in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. A small group 
of advisors to the President were the most important decision-makers, regardless of official 
positions.  
The Cold War rivalry in Kenya in the years around independence centred on the divisions 
and factional power struggles within the Kenya Africa National Union (KANU). As Bennett 
wrote in 1966, ‘it seemed as if the Cold War was being fought inside KANU’.16 This was largely 
a contest between Mboya and Odinga, both members of KANU and of the same Luo ethnicity. 
Speich has argued that their differences were not ideological, as both agreed on the need for 
outside technical expertise to develop, but that ‘Cold War categories were repeatedly made use 
of as resources in local power struggles’.17 Mboya had closer relations with the United States, 
organising an ‘airlift’ of students to study there in the early 1960s. He seemed more ‘moderate’ 
to outside observers, and more committed to the West.  
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Odinga, by contrast, was the Kenyan nationalist who pursued the closest connections 
with communist regimes. In 1965, the British Deputy High Commissioner in Kenya wrote that 
‘the history of Communist penetration of Kenya is largely that of Mr. Odinga’s political 
activities’.18 Despite this, Odinga’s actual affinity to communism is questionable. Certainly, he 
favoured diversifying Kenyan connections and expanding contacts with Eastern Europe, the 
USSR and China. He also favoured policies of land redistribution, widely popular in Kenya,19 
and linked socialism to pre-colonial African practices, suggesting that ‘this traditional Luo 
farming was halfway to socialism’.20 Nonetheless, as many scholars and contemporaries 
recognised, his use of communism was often just that – a use of its ideas in ways which would 
benefit him. In 1962, the Director of Intelligence in Nairobi argued that Odinga ‘is no ideological 
convert … international affairs mean little except in the purely parochial context of how they can 
best be turned into local – and by implication, personal – advantage’.21 Britain’s High 
Commissioner in Kenya, Malcolm MacDonald, even suggested that ‘it was likely that the West 
had handled him badly and pushed him into the arms of the Communists’ by supporting Mboya 
over him and not giving him an early ministerial role.22  It is important to recognise the 
oversimplification of presenting this rivalry as solely about the Cold War. Interestingly, this was 
acknowledged even by William Attwood, the first American Ambassador to Kenya, who 
described his autobiography as ‘essentially about what I saw of Soviet and Chinese efforts to 
penetrate and subvert Africa’.23 Yet, in considering KANU, he wrote that ‘the easy way to 
dramatize the Kenyatta-Odinga rivalry is to describe it solely in Cold War terms … But we 
should try to avoid labelling them “pro-East” and “pro-West”’.24 Thus, even Attwood, with his 
clear emphasis on the Cold War, saw the dispute as more complex than this simple dichotomy 
would allow. Odinga himself in his 1967 autobiography recognised that ‘the allegation 
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“communism” has always been a convenient weapon’, and it was certainly one used to effect 
against him.25 In this way, the Cold War provided tools for domestic political conflicts. 
However, Odinga’s position made communism, if anything, less likely to become 
significant in Kenya. Odinga’s contacts with and visits to China and the Eastern bloc helped to 
create a situation in which support for these states became linked to support for him, and as a 
majority of Kenyan politicians did not support him, they correspondingly did not favour 
connections to communist countries. British diplomats believed that:  
Considering this apparently fertile field for cultivation, it may seem surprising that the 
Communist impact on Kenya, significant as it is, is not even greater. To some extent this 
is the product of their success with Mr. Odinga, now the second citizen of the country. 
This very success has had the effect of identifying them too much with one political 
faction and with one suspect tribe26  
Odinga’s political opponents were unlikely to align themselves with his foreign allies. Had 
Odinga managed to come to power, it is probable that he would have followed alternative 
policies, but whilst Kenyatta remained in power, this was highly unlikely.  
Additionally, Odinga posed a direct threat to British interests: coupled with his support 
for communist countries was his accusation of British neo-colonialism. In Moscow in August 
1962, Odinga argued that ‘we cannot be friends with those who consider us as inferior beings – 
we cannot be friends of imperialism’.27 This message was one of the attractions of communism, 
as the Kenyan Director of Intelligence recognised in the same year: ‘African nationalist beliefs 
and demands bear a close resemblance to Communist utterances. In both cases the “imperialists” 
and “neo-colonialists” are the mutual enemy’.28 This was a standard theme of Odinga’s; in May 
1965, Odinga made a series of speeches at rallies in Western Kenya in which he was explicitly 
critical of imperialism and positive about communism. As one British official reported, he  
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claimed that the imperialists had “sucked our blood for a long time and even now the 
sucking tube is still connected to Kenya”. He further claimed that imperialists still have 
influence in the country through their “stooges”, and warned the crowd not to listen to 
talk of a danger of Communism in Kenya. Communism to him was “just like food”29  
Accusations of neo-colonialism were strong at this time across Africa, most strikingly perhaps in 
Ghanaian President Kwame Nkrumah’s book Neo-Colonialism: The Last Stage of Imperialism 
published in 1965.30 But other Kenyans explicitly opposed this: in June 1965, the Minister for 
External Affairs, Joseph Murumbi, gave a speech to Kenyan students in London that ‘to us 
communism is as bad as imperialism’.31 This was no doubt partly intended for a British 
audience, and also, given that the students were already studying in Britain, to an audience 
receptive to this kind of message. But it was also a direct contradiction of Odinga’s ideas and a 
rejection of communism.  
The power-struggles in Kenya’s elite politics came into the open in 1966, with Odinga’s 
resignation from the vice presidency, formation of the opposition Kenya People’s Union (KPU), 
and the Little General Election, which was weighted against the KPU.32 In July 1969, Mboya 
was assassinated, with rumours of the involvement of leading Kenyan politicians.33 In October 
of the same year, the KPU was banned and Odinga arrested as government repression increased 
in the face of political instability.34 The political manoeuvrings within Kenya which ended with 
the demise of Odinga’s power, and the absolute dominance of Kenyatta, are well documented 
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elsewhere.35 Leading Kenyans were looking to assert their agency in international and domestic 
politics, and these were interconnected. Odinga was the greatest political threat to Kenyatta after 
independence. Since Odinga pursued links to the USSR and China, this made Kenyatta’s choice 
easy as he saw that working with the West would ensure the security of his government against 
domestic rivals.  
 
Kenyan foreign policy 
In addition to its influence on Kenya’s domestic politics, the Cold War also shaped 
Kenya’s foreign policy. The Cold War was a crucial part of the global system in which 
decolonisation occurred and new states emerged.36 It thus formed the context in which newly 
independent foreign policies were planned and implemented. New states had to engage with 
Cold War debates in their foreign policies, even when their form of engagement was to follow 
policies of non-alignment and neutrality; and when joining the non-aligned movement, states in 
the global South were constructing Cold War dynamics, not simply responding to them. 
Kenya had less explicit involvement in the Cold War competition for influence than her 
neighbours. The Horn of Africa was one of the regions where the rivalries of the Cold War were 
most in evidence: the Soviet Union supported Somalia and the United States Ethiopia until 1977, 
when the two sides switched.37 Kenya had a particularly difficult relationship with Somalia, 
which claimed a part of Kenyan territory, and the resulting shifta conflict greatly shaped Kenya’s 
foreign relations.38 Somalia in 1963 ‘accept[ed] a $30 million military aid offer from the Soviet 
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Union’, and Soviet support for Somalia made the USSR an unlikely partner for Kenya.39 
Kenya’s most significant regional ally was Ethiopia, as both countries shared the ‘common 
enemy’ of Somalia, and the two countries signed a defence agreement in 1964.40 Both of them 
also had stronger links with the West. Neighbouring Tanzania had closer relations with China 
and the Soviet Union and took seriously the commitment to non-alignment. Kenyatta was at 
times suspicious of Tanzanian President Julius Nyerere and Ugandan President Milton Obote, as 
well as Somalia. Their connections to the communist powers may have encouraged such 
suspicion, and in turn discouraged Kenyatta from working with their external communist 
partners.  
Foreign policies had to be created anew at independence, including establishing 
embassies and High Commissions, and the order in which these were set up gives an indication 
of the priorities Kenya’s new government placed on relations with particular countries. Initially, 
Kenya opened only eight foreign missions: in Britain, France, West Germany, Egypt, the United 
States, the UN, China, and the Soviet Union.41 This indicates a desire to establish ties with the 
major communist and Western powers. Kenya, like other African states, had limited finances at 
independence, and thus policy-makers were making choices about what to do with their 
resources and which countries and relationships to prioritise. Eight was a fairly small number, 
particularly for a country which was a regional economic centre, and Nigeria, another regional 
power and former British colony, had more than twice as many.42 It was not until 1968 that 
Kenya opened more. There was, however, a clear disparity between the number of countries that 
Kenya was represented in and those represented in Kenya. By 1965, there were embassies in 
Kenya from China, the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland and Yugoslavia in 
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addition to major Western powers.43 Kenya was clearly a place where other states felt it 
worthwhile being represented, and this suggests their hopes for influence.  
Kenya, like many former colonies in Africa and Asia, committed publicly to a policy of 
non-alignment; ‘defined as non-commitment to the world’s dominant ideological blocs’.44 At the 
UN, Minister of State Murumbi stated that ‘Kenya’s foreign policy is based on the principle of 
positive non-alignment ... We refuse to be drawn into Cold War manoeuvres, power blocs[,] 
military alliances and similar institutional systems which are intended to serve the interests of the 
Cold War’.45 Kenyatta himself stated in 1965 that ‘our eternal policy is firmly based on non-
alignment. We take no sides, and will not be dragged into intrigue between rival groups and 
power-blocs’.46 Non-alignment could be an advantageous standpoint as it could help states ‘to 
qualify for assistance from both sides’.47 This was one way that African states could assert 
agency and an independent course of action in their international relationships. 
Non-alignment was, however, difficult to achieve and ‘ambiguous’ in interpretation.48 As 
Aluko argues about Africa, ‘since their traditional relationships were with the West, the efforts at 
diversifying their external links have meant striking new links with the socialist countries of 
Eastern Europe and China’.49 Certain African states made significant efforts to extend their 
external relationships and open ties with a range of countries on both sides of the Cold War. 
Kenya did this officially in diplomatic representation, but much less in economic or military 
terms, those areas where alignment could most closely be judged.50 As Kyle has argued, ‘the 
polices of Kenyatta’s Government, officially non-aligned, possessed a quite definite tilt towards 
the West’.51 In aid, investment, and military deals, Britain remained Kenya’s largest and most 
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prominent partner. Kenya was not as obviously tied to a Cold War side as some African states, 
but Kenya’s ideological leanings and partnerships were apparent.  
Kenya also formally adopted a policy of African Socialism which came to symbolise 
Kenya’s ideological standpoint. The 1965 Sessional Paper No. 10 described African Socialism as 
a ‘political and economic system that is positively African not being imported from any country 
or being a blue print of any foreign ideology but capable of incorporating useful and compatible 
techniques from whatever source’. It encouraged foreign investment, stating that Kenya would 
‘borrow technological knowledge and proven economic methods from any country’.52  Much of 
the motivation behind this document was internal and political: it was intended to bypass 
Odinga’s ideas and, as Savage has argued, ‘it was a stroke of semantic genius to call this 
socialism’.53 This meant that it was hard for Odinga and others to argue against it, as it was 
nominally what they wanted, at least in name. The Cold War here proved useful for Kenyatta, 
Mboya and others as it offered a way of using the idea of socialism to limit criticism, and 
suggested that Kenyatta’s government was more left-leaning than it was. In spite of its name, 
however, African Socialism advocated a managed capitalist economy and was a way of 
distancing Kenya from radicalism, and therefore from perceived and potential Soviet influence. 
The British government’s response to Kenya’s African Socialism was positive, seeing ‘generally 
sensible and realistic policies’.54 The policy offered no disincentive to British involvement. 
Indeed, the response from some was so positive that British diplomats in Lusaka questioned: 
‘Did the Kenya Government themselves send copies to other African Governments? … Could 
we not find some way of stimulating this?’.55 The Kenyans were already publicising this, so 
there was no need for such encouragement, but, as this implies, the policies that the Kenyan 
government were pursuing were the kind of policies that British diplomats favoured and wished 
to encourage across Africa more widely. Even so, it is worth reiterating that the policies 
themselves came from within Kenya. In pursuing foreign policies, Kenya’s elite asserted their 
agency; making choices about the relationships to pursue and connections to seek.  
 
52 CAB (65)67: Memorandum by the Minister for Economic Planning and Development, ‘African 
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Bargaining for arms supplies 
Kenya’s public non-alignment and extensive British connections did not mean that the 
Cold War was not influential, or that this relationship necessarily appeared stable and consistent 
from the British perspective. Britain had substantial interests in Kenya, including trade, 
investments, aid, military ties and the European and Asian populations. Kenya’s positioning in 
the Cold War was essential to enable the British government to pursue and maintain these 
interests. British policy-makers also had close personal relations with Kenyatta and his elite, and 
this meant that Kenyatta’s leadership was important to British officials as they sought to ensure 
stability and influence in many fields. Whilst Kenyatta was in control of Kenya, there was little 
chance of dramatic change to this relationship, but a future leader could have challenged this, 
particularly Odinga. As one diplomat reported in 1965: ‘by far the most important way of 
countering Communist influence in Kenya is for us to sustain Kenyatta and his moderate 
supporters in power, and to preserve the considerable influence we have with them’.56  
It was in arms negotiations that the issue of Cold War alignment was most obviously and 
consciously exploited by leading Kenyans in order to get better deals from the British. There 
were multiple negotiations at which the Kenyans deployed these tactics and the British 
responded. Arms sales were a major element of competition for influence within Africa. The 
continent had no local arms suppliers, and so needed to look for outside patrons, one form of 
Africa’s extraversion.57 The period immediately after independence witnessed a large growth of 
arms in Africa. Marte has argued that ‘arms transfers, as well as economic aid and technical 
assistance, constituted the main instruments of policy in the entire Cold War era’.58 Arms were a 
key policy instrument for both donors and recipients, and these could be used to try and play the 
politics of the Cold War for advantage from all sides, with multiple outside powers seeking to 
 
56 Stanley to Tesh, 17 May 1965, TNA DO 213/152/91. 
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provide arms to Africa.59 By the end of the 1960s, the largest arms suppliers to sub-Saharan 
Africa were France, the United States, Britain and the Soviet Union, and arms supplies from the 
Soviet Union increased dramatically in the 1970s.60 Britain remained Kenya’s largest arms 
supplier after independence, although Kenya’s military did not grow as much or as quickly as 
many within the continent.61 Clayton has argued that Britain’s military connections with Kenya 
were ‘arrangements of minimal political and military significance’.62 In fact, these were a vital 
part of Britain’s relationship with Kenya.  
The issue of arms supplies was a crucial area of Anglo-Kenyan cooperation. Arms deals 
were of such significance because they entailed a longer-term relationship. Along with arms 
supplies went the military training required to use the equipment, maintenance, spare parts and 
follow-up equipment. This meant a continuing relationship between arms suppliers and 
recipients. It was therefore not easy for African states to follow a policy of non-alignment by 
using military equipment from different countries: others could not provide the necessary spare 
parts or continued maintenance. Thus, picking who would supply arms encouraged an extended 
relationship beyond simply the duration of the negotiation and delivery. Patron-client 
relationships provide benefits and obligations in both directions, which Chabal and Daloz have 
termed ‘bonds of mutually beneficial reciprocity’, and this was also true of relationships between 
external patrons and their African clients.63 As well as the British government supplying arms, a 
British military training team was stationed in Kenya and Kenyan officers went to Britain for 
training.64 This encouraged a spiral of mutual reliance: the more Kenyatta used the British to 
entrench his position, the more useful and necessary they became, and vice versa.  
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For newly independent African states, it was not so much the militaries of their 
neighbours but their own military forces that posed the greatest threat. Coups were frequent in 
Africa, and the prospect of military overthrow was real. There was an attempted coup in Ethiopia 
in December 1960 and the ‘first substantive coup d’état’ in Togo in 1963 was ‘followed by a 
rash of military takeovers’.65 In Kenya, this threat was made obvious by the army mutiny in 
January 1964, just weeks after independence. In Zanzibar, revolution in January 1964 succeeded, 
the government was overthrown and the Sultan deposed. Army mutinies in Tanganyika, Uganda 
and Kenya led all three leaders to call on Britain for military assistance to stop the mutinies, 
which the British government readily assented to. As Parsons has argued, ‘the nature of their 
mass disobedience had profound political implications … and called the legitimacy and stability 
of the new regimes into question’.66 Although the mutinies did not progress very far, without 
British assistance to quell them, they might have developed further. These showed the danger 
that the military could pose to African leadership, and meant that control over the military was of 
paramount importance. A key example of this danger was the overthrow of Nkrumah in 1966. 
Nkrumah had led the Gold Coast to independence as Ghana and been preeminent among African 
nationalist leaders, a leading advocate of Pan-Africanism. The successful coup against him 
showed that even the most prestigious and well-known leaders were not exempt from this threat. 
In Kenya, the possibility of a coup also made political opponents, such as Odinga, particularly 
threatening.  
In 1964, the British and Kenyans signed a Memorandum of Intention and Understanding, 
securing a close military relationship, with key benefits including overflying and air staging 
rights for Britain, as well as British support and training for the Kenyan military.67 Kenya had 
also had offers of military support from both the USSR and China. The British High 
Commissioner was therefore positive about this agreement not only because of its benefits to 
Britain but because ‘our offer topped both the Chinese and Russian offers ... Not only did we get 
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the last word, for the time being at least, but we got by far the loudest’.68 He was very aware that 
Britain was competing for influence in Kenya and pleased that this had been successfully 
achieved. He also highlighted the favourable press reaction in Kenya, where ‘none thought that 
we were either blowing a propaganda trumpet or playing Cold War politics’.69 Kenyatta’s 
preference for working with Britain rather than the USSR or China or, indeed, the United States 
was beginning to be revealed.  
In 1965, military advisors and arms arrived in Kenya from Czechoslovakia and the Soviet 
Union, with the rumour that these were intended for an Odinga-led coup. Whether this had been 
previously organised by leading Kenyans is not entirely clear.70 Czechoslovakia had hopes of 
gaining influence in Kenya through Odinga, and Muehlenbeck argues that in 1964 their 
government had made ‘several agreements directly with Odinga that circumvented the Kenyan 
government’.71 The British government was asked by Kenyatta to give military support in the 
case of a coup attempt, which British officials agreed to, creating a plan for military 
intervention.72 As this shows, British officials were concerned by the possible dilution of their 
influence that Soviet military presence in Kenya could bring and were eager to maintain as much 
influence as possible, to the exclusion of others. Odinga made no attempt at a coup. The Soviet 
ship and advisors were publicly turned away from Kenya, clearly signalling Kenya’s diplomatic 
and military positioning.73 This episode cemented Kenyatta’s distrust of the USSR and 
diminished Odinga’s influence. After 1965, Kenya’s relations with the Soviet Union were 
‘extremely cool’.74 In 1966, Kenya expelled three Czechoslovak diplomats; in 1967, the 
Kenyans expelled the Chinese Ambassador and limited their own diplomatic mission to China.75 
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By 1967, Kenya’s Cold War position was much more securely within the Western bloc – 
even if not officially. With Kenyatta unquestioned as president and the openings for the KPU 
limited, there was greater British certainty that their influence in Kenya was secure. The 
preference among leading members of Kenya’s elite for Britain as a supplier and partner above 
other Western allies continued, and this made Kenya important to Britain as ‘a bit of Africa 
where we have (so far), and we hope to continue to do so, successfully upheld stability in the 
general Anglo-American interest’.76 Western, and especially British, influence in Kenya was 
strong, but not unchallenged. The USSR continued to attempt to gain influence as a military 
supplier and through military training. In 1967, the Soviet Union offered ‘a gift of four 
helicopters’.77 This was particularly noteworthy as possible assistance from Western partners 
would not be in the form of a ‘gift’, but of supplies which the Kenyans would have to pay for. 
The Soviet policy of offering ‘gifts’ was part of a broader strategy. In 1956, the Soviets offered 
‘stringless aid’ to Burma, India and Afghanistan and, Sayle argues, ‘this style of exchange 
avoided stirring resentment in smaller countries that resulted from aid that seemed patronising’.78 
This offer to Kenya seems to have been a Soviet attempt to resume a military relationship with 
Kenya after their ship had been expelled two years earlier. 
At the same time, the Kenyans were looking to acquire military equipment from the US, 
Britain and West Germany, with ‘a comprehensive shopping list of military and security 
equipment’.79 In discussing this with the British, Kenyan Defence Minister Njoroge Mungai was 
explicit that ‘sometimes when Kenya’s old friends had been unable to help, other countries (e.g. 
the USSR) had offered help. Dr. Mungai said he felt like accepting these offers sometimes, but 
had not yet been obliged to do so. Because of Kenya’s defence relations with the United 
Kingdom, she naturally turned to Britain for help’.80 This offered both a sense that Mungai 
wanted to continue with British assistance, but also that he was prepared to consider other 
options, particularly if support from Britain was not as forthcoming or generous as he wanted. 
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He was clearly pitting the possible suppliers against one another to try and reach the most 
beneficial outcome. Given the oppositional nature of the Cold War, Soviet support for Kenya 
would mean a relative decrease in British influence, and thus was something the British 
government wanted to avoid. If the Soviet Union introduced a training team this could be 
‘potentially embarrassing’ due to the British training team already in Kenya.81 Nonetheless, 
British officials were aware that Mungai was ‘using this Russian offer as a lever’ to try and 
acquire helicopters from Western allies.82 The British High Commissioner recognised that there 
were Kenyan ‘Ministers who think that Kenya should accept the offer of four Soviet helicopters, 
to manifest her non-alignment’.83 Still, he considered it ‘most unlikely however that the dialogue 
with the Russians will come to anything’, although it was possible that the Kenyans ‘will revert 
to it as a blackmail in the event of frustration’ with alternative offers.84 He clearly recognised the 
role of Soviet arms offers in giving the Kenyans a negotiating tool. In the event, the Kenyans did 
not accept the Soviet offer. Western partners also did not supply what was requested, which 
Branch has argued was because they hoped to limit the possible scale of the shifta conflict with 
Somalia.85 
In pursuing their military relationships, Kenyans around Kenyatta asserted their agency; 
making deals with the British, rejecting Soviet advisers, and seeking to pit opposing powers 
against one another. This often worked to the British advantage and the Anglo-Kenyan military 
relationship was strong. Nonetheless, it was Kenya’s elite who made crucial choices which 
enabled this relationship to remain close.  
 
Buying jets 
In mid-1969, leading Kenyans employed similar tactics to great effect to arrange the 
purchase of jet aircraft from Britain. This final section will focus on these negotiations. They 
reveal Kenyatta’s use of Cold War rhetoric to assert his agency in bargaining with the British. 
 
81 Brief for the Defence Secretary and Commonwealth Secretary, Meeting with Bruce McKenzie, 12 April 
1967, TNA FCO 31/228/1. 
82 Ibid. 
83 Peck to Norris, 7 April 1967, TNA FCO 31/228/3. 
84 Ibid. 
85 Daniel Branch, ‘Violence, decolonisation and the Cold War in Kenya's north-eastern province, 1963–
1978’, Journal of Eastern African Studies 8, no. 4 (2014): 648 
18 
 
Kenyatta wanted to equip the Kenya Air Force with jet aircraft; in large part because of the 
political situation of Kenya’s neighbours: ‘there is a very strong element of “keeping up with the 
Jones’s” in their decision; all their neighbours have jets’.86 It was not just that they had jets, 
however, but that their jets were supplied by the Soviet Union and China. China was funding a 
Tanzanian air force expansion; from 1967, Uganda had begun turning to the Soviet Union for 
arms supplies; and in May 1969, a coup occurred in Sudan, with the new leadership turning to 
the Soviet Union: ‘Kenya found itself in a situation in which it was threatened by what it 
perceived as socialist encirclement’.87 This regional dynamic meant both that leading Kenyans 
were concerned about their neighbours’ activity, but also that British officials wanted to ensure 
that Soviet penetration did not spread further. Kenya was the leading British ally in the region 
and this made the threat from communist competition appear even more acute.  
Kenya’s elite was keen to buy from Britain, signing a letter of intent on 14 May 1969 
with the British Aircraft Corporation to buy six BAC 167 Strikemaster aircraft and making an 
initial payment of £50,000; although with the possibility of withdrawal.88 Despite this, the 
Kenyans had other offers. Most significant was the Soviet offer of MIG aircraft and training, free 
of charge. There was also an Italian offer of similar aircraft on better terms.89 Munene has argued 
that ‘as long as Kenya sided with the West in the Cold War struggle, Britain was unperturbed by 
Kenya’s diversifying its foreign relations’.90 In fact, although Cold War allies were certainly 
preferable, the British government hoped to maintain their dominant influence, and did not want 
to dilute their military presence except in ways that suited them. As Onslow has recognised, 
British officials ‘did not view global geo-politics entirely through Cold War lenses’.91 The Italian 
offer was therefore a concern, and Italy had already provided planes and training for Zambia 
when Britain had refused this.92 British policy-makers hoped to preserve Kenya’s pro-British 
 
86 Le Tocq for Parliamentary Under-Secretary, ‘Supply of Aircraft to the Kenya Air Force’, 26 June 1969, 
TNA FCO 31/371/60. 
87 Okumu, ‘Foreign Relations’, 250; Le Tocq for Parliamentary Under-Secretary, ‘Supply of Aircraft to 
the Kenya Air Force’, 26 June 1969, TNA FCO 31/371/60. 
88 Rothwell to Ministry of Defence, 22 May 1969, TNA FCO 31/371/75. 
89 Le Tocq to Tebbit and Peck, 4 July 1969, TNA FCO 31/372/95. 
90 Njagi Arthur Munene, The Colonial Legacy in Kenya-British Military Relations: 1963-2005, MA 
Thesis, Kenyatta University, (November 2013), 75. 
91 Sue Onslow, ‘The Commonwealth and the Cold War, Neutralism, and Non-Alignment’, International 
History Review 37, no. 5 (2015): 1061. 
92 DeRoche, ‘Asserting African Agency’, 979. 
19 
 
rather than just pro-Western alignment. Whilst they perceived the Soviet offer as the greater 
threat, they also did not want the Kenyans to accept the Italian offer.  
In considering the sale of jet aircraft to Kenya, the British government was keen to 
protect their own interests. In June 1969, Norris wrote of Kenya that ‘while paying tribute to the 
slogans of African nationalism, she has been on the whole a moderating influence on other 
African states and has firmly resisted Communist overtures’.93 Norris was positive about Kenya 
as a place of British influence and investment. He also recognised that ‘Kenya is regarded 
throughout Africa as Britain’s friend. In almost every field of activity, the Kenyatta Government 
looks first for help to us, and make no secret of their preference for British advice or their 
reliance on British professional standards’.94 The nature of this close relationship meant that 
officials argued that ‘if the Kenyans were to accept the Russian offer, the future of our defence 
interests in Kenya would be at considerable risk’.95 Britain had extensive defence interests in 
Kenya, with British troops allowed to train in Kenya twice a year, strong defence sales, and 
British officers in command of Kenya’s Navy and Air Force. The ‘need to ensure that the Kenya 
Government buy British aircraft’ was a priority as it would secure the continued British presence 
in the Kenyan Air Force as well as other benefits.96 The British government was also concerned 
to protect their geostrategic interests. A brief for the Defence Secretary argued that ‘we attach 
considerable value to our training facilities and to our staging rights and, so far as we can see, we 
want these to continue. Our naval facilities at Mombasa are needed so long as the Beria Patrol 
continues’, but also that after withdrawal from East of Suez in 1971, naval facilities at Mombasa 
would be less significant, although training facilities in Kenya would remain valuable.97  An 
expansion of perceived Soviet influence could threaten this position. The High Commissioner 
argued that if the sale did not progress, ‘we shall risk being ousted (as we have been in Zambia) 
from the key position which we hitherto enjoyed in the armed forces’.98 The examples of 
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diminished relationships elsewhere encouraged the idea that the relationship with Kenya was 
particularly valuable.  
Alongside Defence Minister Mungai, the leading Kenyan in the negotiations to buy jets 
was Bruce McKenzie, Minister of Agriculture, and the only white minister in Kenya after 
independence. He was part of Kenyatta’s inner elite, sometimes rumoured to be a British spy, 
and held a ‘covert brief from President Kenyatta for Defence and Security matters’.99 McKenzie 
had close relations with the British in multiple fields and was particularly adept at using these to 
his advantage in negotiations. At the start of July, McKenzie and Mungai met with British 
ministers. As with the helicopters a few years earlier, the Soviet offer was more generous, and 
the Kenyan demand was for the British to offer better terms. Kenyatta wrote directly to British 
Prime Minister Harold Wilson ‘to outline to you personally the great importance I attach to this 
project’.100 Kenyatta used the Cold War as his main argument to encourage British action. He 
argued that ‘the growing competition between the Soviet Union and China for influence in 
Eastern Africa, constitutes a serious threat to the security and stability of the whole area’, and 
that although Kenya could afford to buy from Britain at the given price,  
the readiness of the Soviet Union to provide aircraft and training facilities, on generous 
aid terms, cannot be omitted. I should be reluctant to take advantage of such an offer … I 
am sure that the right course is for both of us to maintain and strengthen the close 
connection we have had and enjoyed with the British Armed Services. If, as I hope, we 
can acquire British aircraft, it will demonstrate to our neighbours that we do not have to 
look to the Russians or Chinese for the supply of modern equipment101  
Kenyatta’s close ties with Britain were evident, and it would have been difficult to believe that 
he was keen to turn to the Soviets. But British planners recognised that his attitude ‘appears 
designed to leave all options open for them’.102 Kenyatta made clear his preference for working 
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with Britain, but he was not willing to entirely rule out accepting other offers until he had the 
best possible terms.  
Which offer of jets would be accepted was influenced by the divisions within Kenyan 
politics. Odinga had left KANU, but remained leader of the opposition, and there were at least 
some others who would have welcomed a greater diversification of suppliers. McKenzie ‘said 
that there was a feeling in Kenya that the country’s friendly relations with the U.K. were not 
paying adequate dividends’.103 He argued that ‘if President Kenyatta was going to be able to sell 
a British buy to his Cabinet, he would need to convince his colleagues, who had noted the very 
favourable terms Communist countries were offering … that they were getting a very good 
bargain’.104 In highlighting cabinet divisions, Kenyatta and McKenzie provided a justification 
for why they needed a better deal from Britain, when they themselves favoured buying British 
aircraft. Mungai and McKenzie wanted ‘some financial concessions which would enable them 
successfully to oppose’ those within the cabinet who would not favour the British offer.105 The 
British High Commissioner Eric Norris expected Soviet publicity ‘that their generous offer had 
been refused’, and that the KPU could use this to gain political capital at the next general 
election.106 This suggestion of a divided Kenyan cabinet made the possibility of Kenyatta 
accepting the Soviet offer appear more realistic, and was a clear incentive for the British to offer 
better terms to ensure that they won the contract. For the British government, the Soviet offer, if 
accepted, brought with it the possibility of limiting wider British interests in Kenya, particularly 
in the military field. 
Taking these considerations into account, in response to Kenyatta’s direct request, in 
which he raised so strongly his concerns about communist influence, the British government 
began to consider what possible assistance they could give. Although ministers recognised that 
‘there may well be a strong element of bluff’ in the Kenyan position, they did not feel able to 
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ignore it.107 To keep the contract, officials and ministers agreed that they needed to offer 
something more. Ministers were reluctant to give money directly to the capital costs of the jets, 
and so the focus turned to the cost of training pilots in Britain and the British training team in 
Kenya. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary wrote to the Chancellor to urge covering half 
the costs of training the pilots as ‘ways must be found to make this purchase possible’.108 The 
Treasury agreed – ‘in spite of our serious general difficulties over public expenditure’ – to pay 
for additional training, ‘not exceeding £50,000 for 1969-70 and £100,000 for 1970-71’.109 Those 
in the Foreign and Commonwealth Office urged giving further assistance, potentially using aid 
funds, but this was rejected by the Treasury and Ministry of Overseas Development.110 
The offer was made to the Kenyans of training, and a reduction from 15 to 10 per cent of 
the costs paid on delivery, leaving 80 per cent to pay over the following five years (having paid 
10 per cent at the time of order).111 In offering this, Wilson pointed out that ‘I fully appreciate 
the dangers for Kenya of the growing rivalry between the Soviet Union and Communist China in 
Eastern Africa’.112 In his reply, however, Kenyatta further reiterated the threat from ‘the 
considerable communist presence in the military field in this part of Africa … it seemed to him 
of great importance that Kenya should stick to her trusted friends and not risk letting communist 
influence into the country’.113 He thus asked for further help, perhaps using aid money; not 
knowing that this had already been discussed and discounted. Although they had not planned to 
offer anything else, the British government discussed what additional incentive they could offer, 
as ‘it is clear that we need to find some further concession if we are to ensure that the Kenyans 
buy British aircraft’.114  
In reconsidering this, the Italian offer was again raised. In previous discussions, British 
officials had not seen evidence of an Italian deal, and so had largely discounted this. Now, they 
had a new understanding that this was likely funded by Italian oil interests, not the Italian 
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government, adding an additional concern about British oil interests.115 Mungai now hinted that 
he would rather buy from Italy, and British officials believed that other Kenyans would also 
favour ‘an opportunity of demonstrating to Africa that Kenya is prepared to take a completely 
independent line when it suits her’.116 When meeting the British Deputy High Commissioner, 
Mungai let him see the Italian offer sitting on his desk, but consistently refused to disclose the 
details, in an attempt to force the British to try and outbid it.117 In London, using aid money to 
pay for the capital costs was again discussed and rejected. Instead, the decision was taken to pay 
for the total cost of training in Kenya, rather than just half as had previously been offered.118 The 
Prime Minister sent a personal message to Kenyatta that this was ‘a substantial further 
contribution’ of ‘real, practical and unconditional help’.119  This proved enough: the British offer 
was accepted and the six aircraft were supplied. The Soviet offer was rejected and Kenya 
maintained her connection with the British Royal Air Force, while Britain maintained her 
position as Kenya’s dominant military supplier.  
 
Conclusion 
The Cold War had a significant impact in shaping Kenya’s internal and external 
relationships in the immediate years after independence as Kenya’s new leaders were debating 
and deciding their policies and international positioning. Kenyatta’s objectives spread well 
beyond the Cold War, and were not always or entirely shaped by it. Nonetheless, it could prove 
useful in both internal and external politics. In the conflicts between Odinga and Mboya, the 
Cold War provided a framework in which to situate their debates and to argue their case, as well 
as to accuse the other. In foreign policy, Kenya’s government explicitly followed non-alignment, 
but under Kenyatta’s leadership Kenya pursued a close relationship with Britain and, especially 
after 1965, had limited contact with the USSR or China. The Cold War worked as a resource in 
Kenyan foreign policy debates, particularly with the use of ‘socialism’ in African Socialism.  
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The Cold War was useful as a bargaining chip for leading Kenyans in their relations with 
Britain, and it was a tactic that worked. Kenyans were able to assert significant and substantial 
agency in their relationship with Britain. The Cold War was rarely the centrepiece of the Anglo-
Kenyan relationship, but did serve to complicate it by offering the Kenyans potential 
alternatives. It was clear, even before independence, that the British government was concerned 
about the prospect of communism in Kenya, and this continued as they sought to maintain 
influence. Even though British officials often recognised that turning to the Soviets was a 
Kenyan negotiating tactic, and that Kenyatta and his leading elite favoured working with Britain, 
they still viewed an enhanced Kenyan relationship with the USSR as a possibility, and that 
encouraged them to offer further concessions and support. The Kenyans were aware of this 
British concern, and raised this during negotiations. This highlights the uncertainties which could 
surround Cold War allegiances. Soviet influence seemed a threat to British interests even in 
Kenya where British influence was predominant above other external powers. The benefits for 
Kenyatta of using this as a negotiating tactic within a framework of non-alignment were clear. 
Although aware that this was a tactic, British policy-makers did not ever want to call the Kenyan 
bluff. As Britain’s High Commissioner acknowledged in 1969, Soviet offers ‘put pressure on us 
to give more generous terms than we would otherwise wish’.120 Kenyatta was thus able to use 
the Cold War to directly shape British policy, clearly demonstrating the extent of his agency in 
this relationship and the ways in which the Cold War could prove beneficial to newly 
independent African governments. Even though Kenyatta was committed to a British 
relationship and had limited connections outside the Western bloc, still the Cold War was 
explicitly used by him and his ministers as a bargaining tool to manage their relationship with 
Britain.  
The uses made by leading Kenyans of the Cold War rule out any simplistic 
understanding: the Cold War was not unified and certain, projected onto smaller powers, but 
could be used and adapted for advantage by groups and individuals well away from the locus of 
the geopolitical conflict. The ideologies underpinning the Cold War did not have to be taken too 
seriously for it to be engaged with, shaped and reshaped in accordance with one’s interests. The 
Cold War provided economic opportunities for some in Kenya, and a mechanism of marketing 
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and defining a place in the world. Although it was the British High Commissioner who talked of 
‘playing Cold War politics’, it was more often the Kenyans who used the Cold War as a card to 
play, or a bargaining chip, in this relationship. For leading Kenyans, ‘playing Cold War politics’ 
could be a useful and beneficial way of interacting with the British government, which then used 
similar ideas as officials sought to respond to Kenyan demands. This could lead to better terms 
for Kenya in negotiations as British policy-makers worked to build and then maintain their 
position as Kenya’s closest foreign partner. In this way, individuals and governments distant 
from the main debates sought to make the ideologies of the Cold War work for them. 
 
